Special feature
The Eighth Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, held in May 10, was talk of the town for at least a month. To meet a statutory requirement, 189 signatory states
to the Treaty meet every five years for such review conferences. Three out of previous seven gatherings failed to produce a declaration, including the last one held in 2005. The only countries which are not NPT members, are India, Israel and Pakistan, while North Korea withdrew from the Treaty seven years ago to pursue its nuclear weapons programme.
Of these four, three are declared nuclear weapon states, whereas Israel has an unacknowledged
nuclear arsenal. NPT is the world's single most important pact on nuclear arms, credited with
preventing its spread to dozens of nations since entering into force in 1970. However, some
intellectuals assert that the NPT managers have instigated major nuclear weapons drives through
apartheid like selectivity, while implementing otherwise straight forward and innocently worded
Treaty provisions. In this context, the UN conference's Filipino president had put the marathon
event in an interesting perspective. Ambassador Libran N Caba-ctulan said: "It's like a
recommitment of marriage vows to the Treaty, as the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament, non-
proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy."
Moreover, one school of thought is portraying the NPT review conference akin to "nuclear
Copenhagen." It is of the opinion that as in case of the climate summit, it calls for complex trade-
offs. The eventual outcome may mean different things to different interest groups. And, like the
climate conference, the failure may not be acknowledged; it may even be projected as a major
success.
to the Treaty meet every five years for such review conferences. Three out of previous seven gatherings failed to produce a declaration, including the last one held in 2005. The only countries which are not NPT members, are India, Israel and Pakistan, while North Korea withdrew from the Treaty seven years ago to pursue its nuclear weapons programme.
Of these four, three are declared nuclear weapon states, whereas Israel has an unacknowledged
nuclear arsenal. NPT is the world's single most important pact on nuclear arms, credited with
preventing its spread to dozens of nations since entering into force in 1970. However, some
intellectuals assert that the NPT managers have instigated major nuclear weapons drives through
apartheid like selectivity, while implementing otherwise straight forward and innocently worded
Treaty provisions. In this context, the UN conference's Filipino president had put the marathon
event in an interesting perspective. Ambassador Libran N Caba-ctulan said: "It's like a
recommitment of marriage vows to the Treaty, as the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament, non-
proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy."
Moreover, one school of thought is portraying the NPT review conference akin to "nuclear
Copenhagen." It is of the opinion that as in case of the climate summit, it calls for complex trade-
offs. The eventual outcome may mean different things to different interest groups. And, like the
climate conference, the failure may not be acknowledged; it may even be projected as a major
success.
The NPT may not be in a serious danger of implosion. Its signatories extended its life indefinitely
in 1995; however, the underlying bargaining cornerstones, which prompted this extension, are
giving way. The bargain hinged on two pillars viz the nuclear weapon states would disarm and
share their technology for peaceful purposes; and in return, the non-nuclear weapon states would
not try to acquire nuclear weapons. Since 15 years, these utopian promises by the 'nuclear haves'
have had the 'have-nots' chase a wild goose.
Nevertheless, the NPT is haunted by various structural dysfunctions. Despite the glaring realities
of the emergence of neo-nuclear weapon states, Treaty managers are bent upon following an
ostrich like approach and continue to treat these states as NNWS. One wonders how keeping these states out of NPT could ensure an effective non-proliferation.
The Treaty is constructed on three pillars that are non-proliferation, disarmament and the right to
peaceful use of nuclear energy. Strengthening, as indeed erosion, of these pillars has been in a roller coaster fashion; often analogous to one-step forward and two backwards. This pattern has contributed towards phenomenal snowballing of trust deficit between the nuclear haves and have-
nots. Thus, the basic role of the Treaty is to inhibit the multiplication of nuclear weapons. It has neither prevented horizontal, nor vertical proliferation. Nuclear weapon states continue to give
pre-eminence to their nuclear capabilities in their national security calculus and have been
engaged in continuous up gradation of their arsenals.
Likewise, disarmament has remained a far cry. Stocks of most of the NWS continue to be
shrouded in mystery. This coupled with the ambiguity-clad nuclear doctrines of some of these
states have created a sense of perpetual insecurity among other states. The NWS are yet to
comply with their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty towards disarmament. At best all
they have done so far is cosmetic actions of making some weapons non-operational and placing
them in semi-storage status; from where these could be brought to operational status whenever
required.
in 1995; however, the underlying bargaining cornerstones, which prompted this extension, are
giving way. The bargain hinged on two pillars viz the nuclear weapon states would disarm and
share their technology for peaceful purposes; and in return, the non-nuclear weapon states would
not try to acquire nuclear weapons. Since 15 years, these utopian promises by the 'nuclear haves'
have had the 'have-nots' chase a wild goose.
Nevertheless, the NPT is haunted by various structural dysfunctions. Despite the glaring realities
of the emergence of neo-nuclear weapon states, Treaty managers are bent upon following an
ostrich like approach and continue to treat these states as NNWS. One wonders how keeping these states out of NPT could ensure an effective non-proliferation.
The Treaty is constructed on three pillars that are non-proliferation, disarmament and the right to
peaceful use of nuclear energy. Strengthening, as indeed erosion, of these pillars has been in a roller coaster fashion; often analogous to one-step forward and two backwards. This pattern has contributed towards phenomenal snowballing of trust deficit between the nuclear haves and have-
nots. Thus, the basic role of the Treaty is to inhibit the multiplication of nuclear weapons. It has neither prevented horizontal, nor vertical proliferation. Nuclear weapon states continue to give
pre-eminence to their nuclear capabilities in their national security calculus and have been
engaged in continuous up gradation of their arsenals.
Likewise, disarmament has remained a far cry. Stocks of most of the NWS continue to be
shrouded in mystery. This coupled with the ambiguity-clad nuclear doctrines of some of these
states have created a sense of perpetual insecurity among other states. The NWS are yet to
comply with their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty towards disarmament. At best all
they have done so far is cosmetic actions of making some weapons non-operational and placing
them in semi-storage status; from where these could be brought to operational status whenever
required.
inordinately long, often leaving room for afterthought triggered evasive manoeuvres.
Unfortunately, the showcasing steps during the last month have also not transcended the cosmetic
strata. This perennial attitude has indeed encouraged the emergence of an alternative, yet
realistic approach towards disarmament. The Tehran Conference on Disarmament and Non-
proliferation is a glaring manifestation of a paradigm shift in the nuclear voice of the
dispossessed ones to affect the disarmament speedily and across the board. It is expected that
unless there is a conceptual change in the attitude and behaviour of NWS, the Tehran voice
would soon attract universal acceptance.
The third pillar of the Treaty states that the non-nuclear states would have the inalienable right to
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. However, nuclear weapon states are selective in allowing access
to the expertise pertaining civil application of nuclear technology. It is amazing to see how the
floodgates of nuclear facilitation have been opened for India, a non-signatory to NPT, and at the
same time how Iran, a member of NPT, is being denied access to peaceful levels of fuel cycle.
Likewise, the NWS are shy of giving unrestricted access to nuclear energy capability to Pakistan,
even under IAEA safeguards. Certainly, the universal acceptance of non-proliferation is being
seriously compromised by this approach of selectivity.
It is a fact that although considerable efforts have been made to strengthen the IAEA, this
institution has not been able to establish its credibility as an independent and impartial entity.
Further strengthening of IAEA needs to proceed alongside boosting its credibility. Setting up of a
nuclear fuel bank at Angarsk, under the IAEA umbrella, is a welcome step. Hopefully, all NNWS
would have inalienable right to buy such fuel. But any attempt to induce selectivity would
encourage proliferation. Probably, North Korea could have been engage in a constructive way to prevent its departure from the NPT under Article X. Unfortunately, the same mistake is being repeated by pushing Iran against the wall. At the same time, Israel's ambiguous nuclear status will have implications. Middle Eastern countries backed indefinite extension of NPT in
exchange for a resolution for making the Middle East a nuclear-free zone. This implied
denuclearisation of Israel. Even after the lapse so many years, no practical steps have been taken in
this regard.
Non-nuclear weapon states have been yearning to accrue negative security assurances from the
nuclear weapon states. Recent initiatives by the US during its Nuclear Posture Review and by its
signing of protocols to some of the nuclear weapon free zones' agreements are steps in the right
direction, other. NWS should follow the suit, but without making exceptions.
From Pakistan's perspective, the NPT is a flawed Treaty. In the past we have faced pressures to
join the Treaty as a NNWS. Such an expectation is not tenable. The Treaty is unlikely to be
revised to accommodate the new nuclear capable states. As such these sates may remain outside
the NPT.
nuclear weapon states. Recent initiatives by the US during its Nuclear Posture Review and by its
signing of protocols to some of the nuclear weapon free zones' agreements are steps in the right
direction, other. NWS should follow the suit, but without making exceptions.
From Pakistan's perspective, the NPT is a flawed Treaty. In the past we have faced pressures to
join the Treaty as a NNWS. Such an expectation is not tenable. The Treaty is unlikely to be
revised to accommodate the new nuclear capable states. As such these sates may remain outside
the NPT.
It would be in the fitness of things to absorb all states into the NPT, on the basis of their present
status, and then proceed towards equity based non-proliferation, nuclear security, safety and
disarmament campaigns. The well-wishers of global zero expect that prudence would prevail and effort would be made to
enable NPT shed its image of an agent of nuclear apartheid. Likewise, the IAEA has to go a long
way to wash off its image that it earned during the days of farce handling of Iraq's WMD issue,
and recently by making country specific exceptions to kick start US-India nuclear deal; whereby
eight Indian reactors have been left out of IAEA safeguards for churning out weapon grade fissile
material.
status, and then proceed towards equity based non-proliferation, nuclear security, safety and
disarmament campaigns. The well-wishers of global zero expect that prudence would prevail and effort would be made to
enable NPT shed its image of an agent of nuclear apartheid. Likewise, the IAEA has to go a long
way to wash off its image that it earned during the days of farce handling of Iraq's WMD issue,
and recently by making country specific exceptions to kick start US-India nuclear deal; whereby
eight Indian reactors have been left out of IAEA safeguards for churning out weapon grade fissile
material.
The writer IS a retired air commodore of the Pakistan Air Force.
Email: khalid3408@gmail.com
